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What is Biosurveillance?
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HSPD-21 (October 18, 2007): 
– “The term ‘biosurveillance’ means the process of active data-
gathering … of biosphere data … in order to achieve early 
warning of health threats, early detection of health events, and 
overall situational awareness of disease activity.” [1]
– “The Secretary of Health and Human Services shall establish 
an operational national epidemiologic surveillance system for 
human health...” [1]
• Epidemiologic surveillance:
– “…surveillance using health-related data that precede 
diagnosis and signal a sufficient probability of a case or an 
outbreak to warrant further public health response.” [2]
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[1]  www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071018-10.html
[2]  CDC (www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/syndromic.htm, accessed 5/29/07)
An Existing System: BioSense
The Problem in Summary
• Goal: Early detection of 
disease outbreak and/or 
bioterrorism
• Issue: Currently detection 
thresholds set naively
– Equally for all sensors
– Ignores differential 
probability of attack
• Result:
– High false alarm rates
– Loss of credibility
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“…most health monitors… 
learned to ignore alarms 
triggered by their system. This 
is due to the excessive false 
alarm rate that is typical of 
most systems - there is nearly 




Formal Description of the System
• Each hospital sends data to CDC daily 
– Let Xit denote data from hospital i on day t
– If no attack anywhere Xit~ F0 for all i and t
– If attack occurs on day t, Xit~ F1, t =t,t+1,...
• Assume only one location attacked
• Threshold detection: Signal on day t* if
for one or more hospitals
• Each hospital location has an estimated 
probability of attack:
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Distribution of Background 
Disease Incidence (f0)




Probability of a false signal:
Probability of a true signal:
























• For each hospital, choice of h is 
compromise between probability 
of true and false signals
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• It’s simple to write out:
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• Hospitals are spatially independent
• Monitoring standardized residuals from model
– Model accounts for (and removes) systematic 
effects in the data
– Result: Reasonable to assume F0=N(0,1) 
• An attack will result in a 2-sigma increase in 
the mean of the residuals
– Result: F1=N(2,1)
• Then, problem is: min  ( 2)















Simplifying to a One-dimensional 
Optimization Problem
• System of n hospitals means optimization 
has n free parameters
– Hard for to solve for large systems
• Can simplify to one-parameter problem:
– Theorem: For F0=N(0,1) and F1=N(g,1), the 
optimization simplifies to finding µ to satisfy
and the optimal thresholds are then
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Consider (Hypothetical) System to 
Monitor 200 Largest Cities in US
• Assume probability of attack is proportional 
to the population in a city
• Assume
– 2σ magnitude event
– Constraint of 1 false signal system-wide / day
• Result: Pr(signal | attack) = 0.388
• Naïve result: Pr(signal | attack) = 0.283
Optimal Solution for 200 Cities
Population Pr(attack) Threshold
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Choosing g and k
• Optimal probability of detection for 
various choices of g and k
– Choice of k depends on available resources
– Setting g is subjective: what size mean 
increase important to detect?
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Sensitivity Analyses
• Optimal probability of detection
• Actual probability of detection 
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Optimizing a County-level System 
Thresholds as a Function of 
Probability  of Attack
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Counties with low probability 
of attack à high thresholds
• Unlikely to detect attack
• Few false signals 
Counties with high probability 
of attack à lower thresholds
• Better chance to detect attack
• Higher number of false signals 
Take-Aways
• BioSense and other biosurveillance systems’ 
performance can be improved now at no cost
• Approach allows for customization
– E.g., increase in probability of detection at 
individual location or add additional constraint to 
minimize false signals
• Applies to other sensor system applications:
– Port surveillance, radiation/chem detection 
systems, etc.
• Details in Fricker and Banschbach (2008)
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Future Research Directions
• Assess data fusion techniques for use 
when multiple sensors in each region
– I.e., relax sensor (spatial) independence 
assumption
• Generalize from threshold detection 
methods to other methods that use 
historical information





• Fricker, R.D., Jr., and D. Banschbach, Optimizing a System of Threshold Detection Sensors, 
in submission.
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